Typically, the price or tax changes that are of the greatest policy interest are those involving substantial rather than marginal changes in price. In these cases substitution effects can be non-trivial. The marginal (i.e. first order) approximations ignore these effects, and therefore, can be seriously biased. To our knowledge, the magnitude of this bias has not been examined before. We do so here, and discuss its importance both theoretically and in the context of an indirect tax reform that adds a new group of goods to the expenditure tax base. Using a plausible description of preferences over broad commodity groups we find that, with indirect tax rates in Europe of between I o0% and 20%, the bias is of the order of 5O% to Io%. For a smaller, but still nonmarginal tax reform we show that a suitable choice of first order approximation can be used to yield only small errors in the measurement of welfare changes without a knowledge of individual substitution elasticities. However, in our empirical example the second-order approximation uniformly produces an improvement in the measurement of changes in aggregate social welfare.
I. APPROXIMATE WELFARE MEASURES
In what follows we examine the issue of welfare measurement at both the individual level, using money metric measures of welfare loss, and at the 'macro' level using a social welfare function to aggregate individual welfare levels. The latter requires information on individual preferences and individual utility weights in social welfare. Define the social welfare function U = U(U1, ... ,UH) = U[V1(X1,P), ... * VH(XH,P)]
over households h = I, ..., H, where uh is the attained utility level of household h, which equals the indirect utility function Vh (Xh, P) of household h having total expenditures Xh and facing price p for the good or service under analysis. We assume throughout that all consumers face the same price p. The indirect utility function also depends on the prices of other goods and may in addition depend on attributes of the household such as demographic characteristics. These other prices and variables are held constant throughout the analysis and so are not included here for notational simplicity. Let qh = qh(xh,p) denote the quantity of the good purchased by household h, expressed as Marshallian demands, that is, as a function of prices and total expenditures. The last equality above follows from the definition of the utility weights ah and Roy's identity, and is commonly used to evaluate the social welfare effects of a price or tax change without explicitly estimating demand or indirect utility functions for individual households.
In the case where all the utility weights equal one, the change in utility just equals the total quantity of the good purchased times the change in price. Intuitively, one expects that this is an overestimate of the effect on welfare, because it equals the effect that would arise from the price change if consumers did not reduce their consumption of the good in response to the price rise. We will show this formally below.
The first order approximation Equation (7) shows that a second, order correction to the usual approximation depends on the price elasticities of both the Marshallian demands and of the utility weights. It will be seen in the next section that sensible utility weights depend on prices except under very special circumstances, and therefore, the price elasticity of 0h in equation (7) is generally non-zero.
Higher order approximations would involve second and higher derivatives of ah and qh with respect top, so the less the price elasticities of these variables vary with price, the better will be the quality of the second order approximation. Similarly, the less oh and qh themselves vary with prices, the better will be the standard first order approximation. utility weights are positive, purchased quantities are non-negative, and own price elasticities are negative (except in the peculiar case of Giffen goods), so unless the price elasticities of the utility weights are positive and large, the second order approximation has a smaller absolute magnitude than the first order approximation. This means that, assuming third and higher order terms in the expansion are small, the standard marginal first order approximation will systematically over estimate the social welfare effect of a non-marginal price or tax change, and the second order term acts to correct this bias.
It is often convenient in applied demand estimation to work with log prices and budget shares instead of level prices and quantities. Applying the same methods as above, this yields the slightly different first and second order approximations Where prices vary across individuals Slivinski (I983) finds a further restriction is required -giving homothetic preferences. Here, we are interested in price independent utility weights for tax reform evaluation and the following theorem is equally restrictive. In particular, it implies that utility weights must depend on prices except in very special cases. This is relevant both because many analyses calculate or use utility weights oh or /h in ways that implicitly assume they are independent of prices, and because the second order approximation equations (7) and (9) The combination of log linear social welfare and homothetic preferences is very restrictive, and Theorem i shows that it can be avoided only by having households' utility weights depend on either prices or on the expenditures of other households.
AU
Utility functions can only be identified up to an arbitrary monotonic transformation. To simplify welfare calculations, we therefore, always choose the representation of preferences that sets uh equal to Xh in the base period for prices, for example, the standard representation of the Almost Ideal model has uh equal to Xh when all prices are set equal to one. Therefore, for a given price regime the standard procedure of setting U(u1, ... ,UH) equal to U(x1, ... ,XH) and hence setting utility weights defined by oh = [aU(Ul *..., UH)/aUh] (aUhl/xh) equal to utility weights defined by oh = aU(X1, ..., XH)/aXh is legitimate, as long as it is recognised that these utility weights also depend on prices (except under the special circumstances defined by Theorem i), and hence will change when prices change. ( This example shows that the use of suitably scaled (Xh)p utility weights is consistent with many popular demand models. Of course, it is still the case that the weights themselves will depend on prices and in general the alnoh/a lnp term in (7) will not disappear.
III. MONEY METRIC MEASURES
There are many drawbacks associated with money-metric measures of utility and welfare. For example, Blackorby and Donaldson (i 988) show that money metric measures generally violate concavity. Also the money metric social welfare function implies by its definition that the social marginal utility of income weights equal one for every household. Therefore, by Theorem I, the money metric measure of social welfare either requires homothetic preferences for all households or it implicitly requires that social welfare depends on some functions of incomes and prices at other than the individual utility level. Despite these substantial problems, money metric measures are commonly used as a substitute for (or approximation to) more formal welfare analyses. With these caveats, in this section we provide first and second order money metric welfare approximations which have an interestingly simple form.
Let xh = ch(uh,p) be the cost or expenditure function, which defines the total expenditure level required by household h to obtain the utility level Uh. Denote the Hicksian, or compensated demand function by aCh(UhIP)/P = qh = qh(Uh p), which also equals qh(Xh,P).
The money metric measure of social welfare is the amount of money required to get every household back to the same utility level they had before the price or tax change. Total expenditures in the population are given by 8)
The only difference between the second order welfare approximation (7) and the money metric approximation (i 8) is that the latter replaces each utility weight oh with one, and the compensated (Hicksian) own price elasticity appears instead of the ordinary uncompensated (Marshallian) own price elasticity. Since compensated own price elasticities are always negative, we can Survey data for the period I 970-86. The budget system is defined over five goods -food, fuel, clothing, alcohol and 'other non-durable goods' -and the sample is restricted to non-retired married couples without children where the head is employed and the household lives in London or South East England. These households are selected to form a reasonably homogeneous group in order to reduce the number of additional demographic factors which need to be controlled for in estimating preferences. Model parameters are estimated using the whole sample (4,785 observations over 68 quarterly price points) and elasticities are computed for each household. However, the welfare analysis that follows is carried out using only those observations observed in the final year of our data. The tax change we choose to illustrate these approximations is a I 7-5 ? tax on clothing. This represents a large price change, but is within the bounds of possibility in government tax reform. Indeed I 7-5 % is the current rate of Value Added (Sales) Tax in the United Kingdom but many groups of goods (including childrens clothing) are exempt; hence proposed moves towards a uniform expenditure tax would require tax changes of this magnitude. For each of the four cases below we plot first and second order approximation errors against log expenditure for each household for the I 7-5 % change in price. In addition, at the end of this section, we will also show how each approximation improves as tax or price changes become smaller.
The first approximations we consider are the first and second order approximations to AU/iXp presented in Figs. I A U/Ap is considerably greater than that of the second order error. On average the first order error is 9-9 % whereas the addition of the second order term in the approximation reduces this average error to 0-3 00 of the true welfare change. First order approximations using the log approximation work better, although the units of the approximation error have changed. The superiority of the first order approximation in logs may be due in part to the lack of the systematic bias that was demonstrated for the first order linear approximation. Fig. 2 shows that for some households the first order approximation error is now negative and the average first order error is substantially reduced (to 1-3 00 Of the true welfare change). The second order approximation is now upwardly biased for every household but the size of this bias is very small. In Figs 3 and 4 we look at approximations to the money metric measure of welfare loss outlined in Section III above -again using an example reform of I 750o tax on clothing. Each figure now shows the first and second order approximation errors expressed as a proportion of the true change in the cost function, C (un,P) PO c (uh, po) against log expenditure for each household in the sample. Once again the magnitude of first order approximation error in Fig. 3 -the approximation to AX/Ap -is much bigger than that of the second order error. The first order case gives an average approximation error of 8-500 whilst the second order average error is i-12 00 . Notice that, in addition, the first order error is positive for every household as predicted in Section III. It, is not
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This content downloaded from 128.40.90.59 on Mon, 02 Nov 2015 17:51:35 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions I238 THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL [SEPTEMBER possible to sign the bias in the second order error due to the elasticity switching between greater and less than one. Finally, Fig. 4 shows that, in direct correspondence to the linear case, for the log approximation measure in (20) the first order approximation behaves much better on average whilst still being some way off for households at either end of the expenditure distribution. In this case the average first order error turns out to be only o003 0 of the true change. Table I gives population summary statistics for each approximation for different size price changes. In each case the summary statistics for the I 7-5 0 price change correspond to the aggregate measures of the household effects illustrated in Figs 1-4 . In addition, however, we present summary statistics for AU/Ap where we have set the inequality aversion parameter in the social welfare function to be quite high (p = -3). As expected all approximations improve as price or tax changes become smaller. Average second order approximation errors are less than first order errors in all cases except for log approximation for l\X/Ap where individual household errors are much bigger (as reflected in the standard deviation) but just happen to average to zero for this dataset (see Fig. 4 ).
V. CONCLUSIONS
There is an obvious attraction to simply using information on observed commodity demands to assess the welfare implications of tax reform. No response parameters are required and therefore the analysis can transcend misspecification of preferences and is not subject to estimation error in own or cross-price demand elasticities. However, tax reforms are often far from marginal and can involve a significant realignment of relative prices. In such cases we have shown that second-order approximations that involve derivatives of demand equations can produce improvements in welfare measurementhighlighting the usefulness of reliable estimates of price and income elasticities.
In certain popular cases we have shown that the difference between first and second order approximations is the same sign for every individual, and therefore, will not average out in any standard aggregate social welfare measure. For a tax reform that adds a new group of goods to the tax base in the United Kingdom at a tax rate of I1 0o we find that the bias can be of the order of 5 0. For smaller reforms we show that suitable first order approximations can work very well. However, the second-order approximations in our examples uniformly procduce improvements in the measurement of changes in aggregate social welfare.
Our results on the comparison of approximations are relative to a set of estimated demand elasticities. The estimation of the elasticities themselves is a different problem. For example, one could non-parametrically estimate'the elasticities to use in the approximations above. In the absence of micro-data one possibility is to use an aggregate estimator of the demand elasticity in the second order correction term. However, there is no guarantee that the aggregate statistic will estimate the average of the individual elasticities without bias. ( Examination of the second order approximation formulas derived here provides information on the adequacy of the different approximations. For example, the smaller are the price elasticities of quantities and utility weights, the better are the standard first order approximations. The closer the price elasticities of the quantities and utility weights are to constants, the better are second order approximations. The first order approximation based on the change in prices has a systematic bias that is not present in the first order approximation based on the change in log prices. Even if the true functional form for demands is unknown, if it is believed to be, say, close to quadratic in log prices, that would suggest using a second order approximation in log prices for welfare analysis.
In this paper we have analysed the quality of approximations defined in terms of ordinary utility functions. This may not be the most relevant metric -for example the success of an environmental tax might be defined in terms of its success in reducing demand for pollutants. We have shown that the first order approximations hold quantities fixed so, at a minimum, second order approximations would be needed to calculate the effects of environmental taxes intelligently. More generally, price elasticity estimates are required for any sensible measurement when the object of interest is changes in quantity demanded rather than change in utility. 
